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COMMODITY FUTURES TRADING COMMISSION V.
WEINTRAUB
INTRODUCTION
The attorney-client privilege' is distinguished as the oldest of the privileges
for confidential communications under the common law.' Although deeply
rooted in American jurisprudence, the attorney-client privilege has come
under recent criticism in the bankruptcy law domain. The dispute concerning
the use of the privilege in that context concerns whether the trustee of a cor-
poration in bankruptcy has the power to waive the debtor corporation's
attorney-client privilege with respect to communications transpiring prior to
the filing of a petition in bankruptcy. In Commodity Futures Trading Commis-
sion v. Weintraub,3 the Supreme Court has held recently that the trustee of a
corporate debtor does have that authority.
The question of the trustee's authority over a corporate debtor's attorney-
client privilege is one for which there are no explicit statutory guidelines."
However, the issue can be discussed under a broad range of policy arguments.
Prior to the Supreme Court's ruling in Weintraub, three United States circuit
courts had considered that precise issue. Despite contrary rulings in the
Second and Eighth6 Circuit Courts, the Seventh Circuit, in Weintraub,7 held
that a trustee does not have authority to waive the privilege. The Solicitor
General urged the Supreme Court to hear the case because of its potential im-
pact on prosecutions of insider trading, commodities scams and other frauds
Although the Supreme Court reversed the Seventh Circuit's ruling in Wein-
traub, the rationale set forth by the Seventh Circuit should be carefully re-
viewed, along with other arguments tending to support the Seventh Circuit's
holding. The strength of the Supreme Court's decision can be judged most ef-
fectively when considered against that background.
After presenting a general discussion of the attorney-client privilege, this
casenote will discuss the facts underlying Weintraub and then review the ra-
'"(1) Where legal advice of any kind is sought (2) from a professional legal adviser in his capacity as such, (3)
the communications relating to that purpose, (4) made in confidence (5) by the client, (6) are at his instance
permanently protected (7) from disclosure by himself or by the legal adviser, (8) except the protection be
waived." 8 J. WIGMORE, EVIDENCE IN TRIALS AT COMMON LAW, §2292 (McNaughton Rev. 1961) (emphasis
omitted).
2Upjohn Co. v. United States, 449 U.S. 383, 389 (1961).
1105 S. Ct. 1986 (1985), revd, 722 F.2d 338 (7th Cir. 1984).
'Id. at 1992.
'In re O.P.M. Leasing Servs., Inc., 670 F.2d 383 (2d Cir. 1982).
'Citibank N.A. v. Andros, 666 F.2d 1192 (8th Cir. 1981).
'Commodity Futures Trading Comm'n v. Weintraub, 722 F.2d 338 (7th Cir. 1984), rev'd, 105 S. Ct. 1986
(1985).
'See 7 NAT'L L.J. Nov. 12, 1984, at 5, col. I.
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tionales of the Seventh Circuit and the Supreme Court in their respective
holdings. This casenote will discuss other arguments which have been raised in
support of the trustee's authority over the privilege. The casenote will conclude
with a discussion of other policy and precedent arguments which urge that the
trustee should not be given this authority.
THE ATTORNEY-CLIENT PRIVILEGE GENERALLY
The attorney-client privilege had its origin during the reign of Elizabeth 1.9
Initially, the privilege was created to uphold the oath and honor of the at-
torney. Today, the privilege is understood to protect the client's right of
privacy.'0 The purpose of the privilege is to encourage clients to consult legal
advisers by removing the fear of disclosure." The availablity of sound legal ad-
vice is an important societal interest, with maximum efficacy when the lawyer
is fully informed of the totality of circumstances regarding his client's situa-
tion. 2 The privilege encourages such full disclosure and is "indispensable for
the purposes of private justice.""
Initially, the privilege was held to apply only to natural persons, but was
extended to corporations by the middle of the nineteenth century.' Where the
client is a corporation, the privilege may be asserted or waived by the board of
directors.'
The attorney-client privilege has been recognized in bankruptcy litigation
since 1872.16 The availability of the privilege to corporations entering bank-
ruptcy has not been questioned." Rather, the issue raised is who may assert or
waive the privilege. It is that precise issue which the Seventh Circuit and the
Supreme Court addressed in Weintraub.
'See generally WIGMORE. supra note I, §2290, at 542.
"°See generally Klein & Lichtenstein, Trustee or Debtor: Who May Assert the Attorney-Client Privilege in
Bankruptcy Proceedings, 57 N.Y. ST. B.J. 35 (1985) [hereinafter cited as Klein].
"See Note, Attorney-Client Privilege for Corporate Clients: The Control Group Test, 84 HARV. L. REV. 424,
425 n.7 (1970). But see Note, Functional Overlap Between the Lawyer and Other Professionals: Its Implica-
tions for the Privileged Communications Doctrine, 71 YALE L.J. 1226, 1262 (1962). The Yale Law Journal
surveyed 108 lay people on the subject of the attorney-client privilege. Fifty-five of those surveyed either
thought attorneys could be compelled to disclose confidences of their client's or did not know those con-
fidences were protected.
"See Klein, supra note 10, at 36.
"Chirac v. Reinicker, 24 U.S. (II Wheat.) 280, 294 (1826).
"See Radiant Burners, Inc. v. American Gas Ass'n, 320 F.2d 314, 319 (7th Cir.), cert. denied, 375 U.S. 929
(1963). See also Note, The Lawyer-Client Privilege: Its Application to Corporations, the Role of Ethics, and
its Possible Curtailment, 56 Nw. U.L. REV. 235 (1961) (on the subject of the privilege as applied to corpora-
tions). The primary objection to extending the attorney-client privilege to cover corporations was that the
privilege was regarded as fundamentally personal in nature and that it is often difficult to determine who
may speak for a corporation.
"Director's powers are created by state law. See Burks v. Lasker, 441 U.S. 471, 478 (1979). See generally
Note, Bankruptcy/Waiver of Attorney-Client Privilege, 73 ILL B.J. 112 (1984).
"In re Krueger, 14 F. Cas. 870 (D. Mass. 1872) (No. 7942).
"In re O.P.M., 670 F.2d at 386; People's Bank v. Brown, 112 F. 652, 654 (3d Cir. 1902).
[Vol. 19: I
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THE FACTS
The Chicago Discount Commodity Brokers, Inc. (CDCB) was a futures
broker with the Commodity Futures Trading Commission (Commission). On
Oct. 27, 1980, the Commission brought a complaint against CDCB, alleging
violations of the Commodity Exchange Act."6 The Commission and CDCB
entered into a consent decree which provided inter alia, for the appointment of
a receiver. On Nov. 4, 1980, the district court appointed John K. Notz Jr. as
receiver. 9 On Nov. 4, 1980, Notz filed a voluntary petition for bankruptcy on
behalf of CDCB.20 The petition was filed under Chapter Seven of the
Bankruptcy Code2' which provides for liquidation. The bankruptcy court then
appointed Notz as trustee of CDCB.12
In its investigation of CDCB, the Commission deposed Gary Weintraub,
former counsel to CDCB.23 Weintraub answered approximately 800 of the
Commission's questions but refused to answer twenty-three other questions on
the basis of the attorney-client privilege.24 Consequently, Notz, as trustee in
bankruptcy, attempted to waive the privilege on behalf of CDCB as to any
communications or information occurring before CDCB entered into receiver-
ship."
On Dec. 15, 1981, the Commission filed a motion to compel the answers
to the remaining twenty-three questions.26 In considering the motion, the
United States magistrate hearing the case concluded that, although Weintraub
had properly invoked the privilege, the trustee has the authority to waive that
privilege.27 On June 9, 1982, the district court upheld the magistrate's order
granting the Commission's motion to compel discovery. 2s
Frank McGhee, president and sole director of CDCB, and Andrew
McGhee, an officer and former director of CDCB, sought leave to intervene in
"Commodity Exchange Act, 7 U.S.C. §§!-26 (1983). The allegations of the complaint concerned possible
fraud on the part of CDCB and its president, Frank McGhee. See 7 NArL L.J., Nov. 12, 1984, at 5, col. 1.
"
9Weintraub, 722 F.2d at 339.
"In re Chicago Discount Brokers, Inc., No. 80-B-14472 (Bankr. N.D. Il1. 1980).
"
1Bankruptcy Reform Act of 1978, 11 U.S.C. §§701-766 (1983).
2Weintraub. 722 F.2d at 339. Under a Chapter Seven proceeding, the appointment or election of a trustee is
automatic. Under a Chapter Eleven reorganization proceeding, a trustee may only be appointed upon a
showing of "fraud, dishonesty, incompetence or gross mismanagement ... by current management" or
where necessary for the best interests of the estate and its beneficiaries. I 1 U.S.C. §1 104(a)(1) (1978).
"Weintraub, 722 F.2d at 339.
"Id. The questions to which Weintraub refused to reply concerned suspected misappropriations of customer
funds by the brokerage's officers and employees. See 7 NArL L.J., Nov. 12, 1984, at 5, col. 3.
"Weintraub, 722 F.2d at 339.
uld.
"ld
nId.
Summer, 19851 RECENT CASES
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the Commission's action against Weintraub.2 9 On June 30, 1982, the district
court granted their motion to intervene.?
On July 27, 1982, the district court ordered Weintraub to answer the
questions at issue." The McGhees moved for a stay, pending appeal of that
order. 2 The district court denied their motion and the McGhees appealed.3
The Seventh Circuit reversed the district court, concluding that a trustee in
bankruptcy could not waive a debtor corporation's attorney-client privilege. 4
THE SEVENTH CIRCUIT'S RATIONALE
The Seventh Circuit gave four justifications for its holding that a trustee
in bankruptcy has no authority to waive a corporate debtor's attorney-client
privilege.
The first justification of the Weintraub court was that the trustee does not
"succeed to the positions of the officers and directors of the corporation."3 The
court noted that the broad delegation of powers given to the trustee through
the Bankruptcy Reform Act are not plenary. 6 The court observed that once a
corporation files a petition in bankruptcy, it continues to serve as a legal entity
and it retains many of its former powers." Accordingly, the court asserted that
the corporation should retain control over the attorney-client privilege," since
the trustee's power to manage the bankrupt corporation's property does not
give rise to absolute control over the corporation's legal rights. 9
"Id. Weintraub had declined to appeal the district court's rejection of the privilege claim and was prepared to
supply the information, but the McGhees appealed to preserve the privilege. See 7 NAT"L L.J. Nov. 12, 1984
at 5, col. 4.
"'Weintraub, 722 F.2d at 339.
311d.
32Id.
"Id. at 340.
1'd. at 343.
Id. at 342.
11Id. For a discussion of the powers and duties of a trustee in bankruptcy, see Note, Waiver of the Attorney-
Client Privilege by the Trustee in Bankruptcy, 51 U. Chi. L. Rev. 1230 (1984). Generally, the code
authorizes the trustee to oversee all the debtor's operations within the ordinary course of business.
"1 Weintraub, 722 F.2d at 342. The powers retained by a corporation during bankruptcy proceedings include
the power to borrow money, transact business and elect officers and directors. See generally 15 A.W.
FLETCHER, PRIVATE CORPORATIONS, §7657 (rev. ed. 1981).
"Weintraub, 722 F.2d at 342.
"Id. One bankruptcy court refused to allow the trustee of a debtor corporation to waive the corporation's
attorney-client privilege partly on the ground that, as the powers delegated to the trustee under the
Bankruptcy Code are enumerated, the absence of an express grant of authority in the area of testimonial
privilege indicates the intention of Congress that this power not be included. In re Vantage Petroleum Corp.,
40 Bankr, 34, 40 (Bankr. E.D.N.Y. 1984).
The legislative history of the code provides little guidance on the question of the trustee's authority in this
area. In §542(e) of the code, which deals with the subject of the turnover of financial information to the
trustee, the drafters wrote that this duty is "subject to any applicable claim of privilege, such as attorney-
client privilege." H.R. REP. No. 989, 95th Cong., Ist Sess. 369 (1977). In other discussions of §542(e) of the
code, Congress has plainly stated that the issue is unresolved, announcing "the extent to which the attorney-
[Vol. 19:1
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The second justification offered by the Weintraub court was the apparent
inequity of prohibiting the trustee of an individual in bankruptcy from waiving
the attorney-client privilege,' ° while affording different treatment to the trustee
of a corporation in bankruptcy." The court based its rationale on the fact that
trustee waiver of the privilege, as to any information sought, creates an empty
privilege. 2 This result would be true regardless of whether the client were a
private individual or a corporation.'3
The third justification, which the court offered for its holding, was that to
allow the trustee of a corporate debtor to waive the attorney-client privilege
would be to discriminate "against the corporate debtor solely on the basis of
economic status."" The court noted that it would be discriminatory to allow
solvent corporations to enjoy the power to assert or waive the attorney-client
privilege, while denying that right to bankrupt corporations.'5 An economic
classification did not impress the court as a valid criterion for selection as to
proper privilege assertion or waiver."
The fourth justification concerned the potential chilling effect, on
attorney-client communications, caused by a decision in favor of the corporate
trustee." The court reasoned that corporate clients may be reluctant to com-
municate freely with their legal counsel for fear that such communication
would be subject to disclosure should the corporation enter bankruptcy. 8 The
court noted that the "[firee interchange between attorney and client is the cor-
nerstone of effective legal representation."' 9
THE SUPREME COURT'S RATIONALE
The Supreme Court relied, principally, on two arguments in holding that
the trustee of a debtor corporation has the authority to waive the corporation's
attorney-client privilege." The first argument presented by the Court focused
client privilege is valid against the trustee is unclear under current law and is left to be determined by the
courts on a case by case basis." 124 CONG. REc. 32, 400 (1978). On the subject of legislative history of the
code provisions relating to the attorney-client privilege, see Note, supra note 36, at 1240 n. 44.
'Cf. In re Smith, 24 Bankr. 3 (Bankr. S.D. Fla. 1982) (holding that the trustee of an individual debtor could
waive the debtor's attorney-client privilege based on the Eighth Circuit Court of Appeal's decision in
Citibank N.A. v. Andros, 666 F.2d 1192 (8th Cir. 1981), which allowed the trustee of a debtor corporation
to waive the corporation's privilege).
'41Weintraub, 722 F.2d at 342.
'4d. at 343. See aLso Note, supra note 15, at 116.
"Weintraub, 722 F.2d at 343.
"Id.
"Id.
4Id.
"Id.
Oid.
Old.
"Weintraub. 105 S. Ct. at 1996. The opinion was written by Justice Marshall. It was joined by all of the
Justices except for Justice Powell, who did not participate in the consideration or decision of the case.
Summer, 19851 R ECENT CASES
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on the position and powers of the trustee." The Court noted that when a sol-
vent corporation undergoes a change in management through takeover,
merger, loss of shareholder confidence or normal succession, the new manage-
ment assumes control over the corporation's attorney-client privilege.52 The
Court stated that where the Bankruptcy Code is silent on the powers of various
actors in a corporate bankruptcy, the Court, in allocating those powers, must
consider the relationship of those actors to the management of a solvent cor-
poration." The Court concluded that the powers of a solvent corporation's
management are more analogous to the powers of a trustee than to those of
the debtor corporation's directors. 4
As the Seventh Circuit noted, the trustee of a bankrupt corporation does
not replace the corporation as an entity, nor succeed to the positions of the cor-
poration's officers or directors." Rather, the corporation continues to exist and
retains a significant portion of its former functions after the filing of the peti-
tion in bankruptcy. 6 Since the bankrupt corporation's existence continues and
the officers and directors retain their positions, the trustee's authority in
managing the corporation's property should not be interpreted as a grant of ab-
solute power over the corporation's legal rights. 7
In one significant respect, the directors of a bankrupt corporation more
closely resemble the management of a solvent corporation than does the
trustee. The fiduciary duties of a debtor corporation's directors are not divided
between the shareholder and the corporation's creditors.5" Conversely, the
trustee's primary loyalty is to the corporation's creditors who elect him and
who will often be the only beneficiaries of his efforts. 9 The Supreme Court
noted that the trustee does owe a fiduciary duty to a corporation's creditors but
dismissed this as "[oine of the painful facts of bankruptcy."'"
The Court stated that, where the corporation is a debtor in possession, its
directors, like the trustee, also owe a fiduciary duty to corporate creditors.6'
Further, the Court noted that it would be an anomaly to deny authority over
Id. at 1993.
121d. at 199 1.
13Id. at 1992-93 (citing Butner v. United States, 440 U.S. 48, 55 (1979)).
"Weintraub, 105 St. at 1993.
"Weintraub, 722 F.2d at 342.
"Id.
"Id. The measure of authority which the trustee can exercise over a bankrupt corporation depends, to some
degree, upon whether the bankruptcy proceeding is a liquidation or reorganization proceeding. Under a
Chapter Seven liquidation proceeding, the trustee has extensive management authority, in contrast to the
powers of a trustee in a Chapter Eleven reorganization case. See 2 COLLIER ON BANKRUPTCY §323.01, at
323-24 (15th ed. 1984).
'See generally Note, supra note 15, at 116.
"See 11 U.S.C. §§702, 726(a) (1983). See also Weintraub, 105 S. Ct. at 1994.
6'Weintraub, 105 S. Ct. at 1994.
"Id. at 1994-95.
[Vol. i19: I
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the privilege to the trustee, while allowing the directors of a corporate debtor
in possession to have this authority, when both share the same fiduciary
duties. 2 If the question of the actor's fiduciary duty is determinative of his
authority over the privilege, it should be noted that, in this respect, the trustee
does not resemble the management of a solvent corporation. 3 The directors of
a corporation in bankruptcy, on the other hand, owe the same duty to the cor-
porate shareholders as they did before the filing of the petition in bankruptcy.6
The second principal argument on which the Supreme Court relied in
deciding Weintraub focused on the federal intersts at issue." The Court stated
that "no federal interests would be impaired by the trustee's control of the cor-
poration's attorney-client privilege."" However, the central purpose of the
privilege is to encourage full and frank disclosure between the attorney and his
client.67 The value of such communication is amplified in the corporate context
where accurate legal advice is necessary for a corporation to conform its con-
duct to the law.68 If allowing the trustee to exercise control over the privilege
serves to discourage corporate clients from seeking legal advice, the likelihood
of unlawful corporate activity increases. 9 Clearly then, the federal interest in
ensuring that corporations do not stray into illegal activities would be impaired
by allowing the trustee to exercise control over the privilege.
The Court noted that the trustee has a duty to "investigate the conduct of
prior management to uncover and assert causes of action against the debtor's
officers and directors."70 The Court stated that the directors of a bankrupt cor-
poration could impair the trustee's investigation by invoking the privilege."
That criticism basically restates the classic conflict between a testimonial
privilege and the public's right to every person's evidence.72 The traditional
attorney-client privilege analysis provides a clear solution to that conflict.
The attorney-client privilege does not protect all forms of communication
between the attorney and his client." Where the communication concerns a
62Id
'See generally Note, supra note 15, at 116 (discussing the contrasting duties of a debtor corporation's direc-
tor and a trustee in bankruptcy).
"Id.
"Weintraub, 105 S. Ct. at 1993.
"Id.
'Upjohn Co. v. United States, 449 U.S. 383, 390 (1981).
"Id. at 391.
"See Note, supra note 15, at 116.
'"Weintraub, 105 S. Ct. at 1993.
7id.
nSee Klein, supra note 10, at 40 (discussing the traditional limitations on the availability of the attorney-
client privilege).
731d.
RECENT CASESSummer, 1985]
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client's contemplated criminal act, the privilege does not apply. 4 Nor does the
privilege apply where the purpose of the communication is to perpetrate a
fraud." The privilege does, however, protect communications relating to
crimes already committed.76 Additionally, communications made after the
commission of a fraud or a tort are covered by the privilege in order to secure
an attorney's adequate preparation of his client's defense."
By applying those principles to the question of the trustee's authority over
the privilege, the resulting rule should require the trustee to make the neces-
sary showing that the desired communications occurred prior to or during the
commission of a crime, fraud or tort, for the purpose of assisting in its commis-
sion."
The Supreme Court noted that the "threshold showing of fraud necessary
to defeat the privilege" can effectively bar a trustee's investigation.79 While the
necessity of such a showing may hinder the trustee's investigation, the social
costs which attend the use of the privilege by directors of a corporate debtor do
not differ from those arising when directors of a solvent corporation claim the
privilege." When board members of a solvent corporation engage in wrongful
conduct, the shareholders may bring a derivative or class action against those
directors on behalf of the corporation.8 That check on the corporate directors'
activity continues to operate after a corporation enters bankruptcy. 2 Addi-
tionally, the trustee can bring an action against the directors on behalf of the
corporation. 3 Therefore, the use of the privilege by a debtor corporation's
directors actually presents a reduced social cost when compared to the exercise
"MODEL CODE OF PROFESSIONAL RESPONSIBILITY DR 4-101(c)(3) (1979) ("A lawyer may reveal the intention
of his client to commit a crime and the information necessary to prevent the crime.")
"Clark v. United States, 289 U.S. 1, 15 (1933) ("There is a privilege protecting communications between at-
torney and client. The privilege takes flight if the relation is abused. A client who consults an attorney for
advice that will serve him in the commission of a fraud will have no help from the law. He must let the truth
be told.").
There are two basic policy reasons for denying effect to the privilege regarding communications made
prior to the commission of a crime, fraud or tort. The first is that to allow the privilege to attach under such
conditions would permit an attorney to be a principal or an accessory to a crime, fraud or tort without fear
of discovery. The second reason for disallowing the privilege under those conditions is that clients should not
be permitted to commit crimes, frauds or torts with the benefit of prior legal advice. An attorney who offers
such advice would be committing conspiracy. See Duplan Corp. v. Deering Milliken, Inc., 397 F. Supp.
1146, 1172 (D.S.C. 1974). See generally, Klein supra note 10, at 40.
"See United States v. Valencia, 541 F.2d 618, 621 (6th Cir. 1976).
"Duplan Corp., 397 F. Supp. at 1172.
"The party seeking to compel such discovery must present a prima facie case of an intended crime or fraud
before the privilege can be disallowed. Clark, 289 U.S. at 15.
"Weintraub, 105 S. Ct. at 1994.
'See generally Note, supra note 15, at 116 (discussing the comparative social costs of the attorney client
privilege in the bankruptcy and non-bankruptcy contexts).
"Id.
"Id During a bankruptcy proceeding, contingent claims may be litigated and will be treated as general
creditor's claims. Northern Pipeline Constr. Co. v. Marathon Pipe Line Co., 458 U.S. 50 (1982).
"See Note, supra note 15, at 116.
[Vol. 19:1
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of the privilege by a solvent corporation. The argument that a special rule
governing the privilege should apply in the bankruptcy context because of the
social costs at issue is therefore unsound.
ARGUMENTS FOR ALLOWING THE PRIVILEGE To PASS To THE TRUSTEE
1. The Property Theory
Some courts, which have considered the issue, have allowed the trustee to
waive the corporate debtor's attorney-client privilege on the ground that the
privilege is property of the estate and, as such, it passes to the trustee along
with the other assets of the debtor.4
The Eighth Circuit Court, in Citibank N.A. v. Andros,85 held that the
trustee of a corporate debtor could waive the corporation's attorney-client
privilege based upon the property theory. Citibank, the principal secured
creditor of a bankrupt corporation,86 sought to inspect documents of the
bankrupt's legal counsel in a Rule 205 examination." The corporation's legal
counsel refused to allow the inspection on the ground of the attorney-client
privilege.8 The trustee in bankruptcy then waived the corporation's privilege.
Citibank's attempts to compel production of the documents in the
bankruptcy and district courts89 were unsuccessful. On appeal to the Eighth
Circuit, the circuit court reversed the rulings of the lower courts on the ground
that "the right to assert or waive the privilege passes with the property of the
corporate debtors to the trustee."90
The Seventh Circuit, in Weintraub, declined to follow the holding in Citi-
bank, partly on the ground that Citibank failed to address the important policy
considerations underlying the attorney-client privilege. 9' In rejecting the ra-
tionale offered in Citibank, the Seventh Circuit might have addressed the prop-
erty theory as inappropriate under the provisions of the Bankruptcy Code. Un-
der §541 of the Code, the property of the estate is "all legal and equitable inter-
ests of the debtor in property as of the commencement of the case." Under
§542, such property is to be transferred to the trustee." However, the power to
14See e.g., In re O.P.M. Leasing Servs., Inc., 13 Bankr. 54, 61 (Bankr. S.D.N.Y.), affd 13 Bankr. 64
(S.D.N.Y. 1981), affd sub nom. Weissman v. Hassett (In re O.P.M. Leasing Servs., Inc.), 670 F.2d 383 (2d
Cir. 1982); Citibank N.A. v. Andros, 666 F.2d 1192, 1195 (8th Cir. 1981).
U666 F.2d 1192 (8th Cir. 1981).
"The corporation was the Hy-Gain Electronics Systems Corporation.
VCitibank, 666 F.2d at 1193.
"Id.
"In re Hy-Gain Elecs., Inc., II Bankr. 119 (D. Neb. 1978).
"Citibank, 666 F.2d at 1195.
,,Weintraub. 722 F.2d at 342.
" I U.S.C. §541(a)(I) (1979).
'II U.S.C. §542 (1979).
RECENT CASESSummer, 19851
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assert or waive the attorney-client privilege is not a right that can be bought,
sold or levied upon by creditors and is, therefore, not property within the
meaning of §541. Since the attorney-client privilege is not property within the
meaning of §541, it is not intended to be transferred to the trustee under
§542. 94
2. The Trustee As Representative Of The Estate
Some courts, holding that the trustee of a corporate debtor should be al-
lowed to waive the attorney-client privilege, have reasoned that the privilege
was designed to "protect and foster the interests of actual litigants."95 There-
fore, as representatives of the property interests of the debtor, the trustee
should be the party to exercise the privilege. That argument contains flaws,
since under the Bankruptcy Code, the trustee does not acquire ownership of
property which passes to him; rather, he becomes the representative of the
estate.96 The argument, therefore, fails to explain why the corporate debtor's
directors, rather than the trustee, should not have authority over the
privilege.97
The arguments offered to support the trustee's power to waive the
attorney-client privilege of a corporate debtor are thus open to serious ques-
tion. To explore the issue more expansively, one must consider arguments,
that were lacking in Weintraub, which urge that the trustee not be given
authority over the corporate debtor's attorney-client privilege.
POLICY AND PRECEDENT ARGUMENTS
The modern corporation must operate within a complicated network of
regulatory legislation." Corporations frequently call upon their attorneys to
ensure that their operations are in compliance with the law." If the threat of
compelled disclosure discourages communication between attorneys and their
corporate clients, it is likely that corporations may needlessly forego legitimate
business activities that might have been pursued under counsel's approval."'
More disturbing is the prospect that a corporation might lose the attorney's
warning when contemplating activities it thought lawful, which, in fact, were
not.101
"See Note, supra note 36, at 1238 (discussing the attorney-client privilege in relation to the property theory).
"In re Amjoe, Inc., I I COLLIER BANKR. CAS. (MB) 45, 49 (Bankr. M.D. Fla. 1976).
*I I U.S.C. §323(a) (1979).
"See Note, supra note 36, at 1238 (discussing the theory of trustee as representative of the estate, relative to
the exercise of the attorney-client privilege).
"Upjohn. 449 U.S. at 392.
"Id.
twId.
"'Id. The Court noted the rebuttal argument that the risk of civil or criminal liability ought to override a cor-
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When a corporation becomes financially insecure, the need for effective
legal advice is particularly great.' Corporations in desperate financial condi-
tion will call upon attorneys for advice in developing survival strategies. 03 On
the eve of a corporate bankruptcy, the need for legal counsel would be at its
strongest.' The corporation must be aware of the options and must accurately
assess the advantages and consequences of each option in light of its own par-
ticular circumstances.0 5 If the attorney-client privilege were allowed to pass to
the trustee in bankruptcy upon the initiation of bankruptcy proceedings, the
fear of compelled disclosure would be most acute precisely at the time when
the need for legal advice is greatest.' 6 The privilege should not be undercut at
the point when its value is richest and its contemplated purpose most plainly
served.
In Butner v. United States, 07 the Supreme Court considered the question
of how rights should be distributed in bankruptcy proceedings when bankrupt-
cy law is silent on the subject."° The issue in Butner concerned the manner of
rent distribution in bankruptcy, when the rents accrued and were paid to the
debtor's estate, while the bankruptcy proceeding was in progress.'" Since the
Bankruptcy Act was silent on this issue,"10 the Court was asked to decide be-
tween applying the state law, which operated in non-bankruptcy cases, or a
federal rule of equity, which would apply only in bankruptcy cases.
The Court announced, in a unanimous decision, that the non-bankruptcy
law would always apply in such situations."' The reasoning of the Court stressed
the need for uniformity as a means of reducing uncertainty, discouraging
forum shopping and preventing one party from receiving "a windfall merely by
reason of the happenstance of bankruptcy.""' The Court's ruling in Butner,
therefore, would suggest that a separate evidentiary rule should not apply in
the context of bankruptcy proceedings, from the rule which operates in non-
bankruptcy cases.
poration's fears of compelled discovery in considering whether or not to seek legal advice. This argument,
the Court said, ignores the fact that even if the corporation chose to seek legal advice, an investigation
undertaken to ensure compliance with the law would be less than thorough without the security of the
attorney-client privilege.
"'See Note, supra note 15, at 116 (discussing the value of the privilege in the bankruptcy setting).
10lad
"'Id
wId
'"Id
w'440 U.S. 48 (1979).
"'See Note, supra note 36, at 1241 (discussing Butner as a guideline in determining the issue of who may
assert and waive the attorney-client privilege).
'"Butner, 440 U.S. at 49.
"lda at 54.
"l11 at 55.
111d (citing Lewis v. Manufacturers Nat'l Bank, 364 U.S. 603, 609 (1961)).
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The manner in which the Supreme Court has treated the privilege against
self incrimination in bankruptcy proceedings reveals considerable insight to
the Court's assessment of the effect of those proceedings on testimonial
privileges in general."' In McCarthy v. Arndstein, ", the Court recognized the
right of an individual to claim the privilege against self-incrimination in pro-
ceedings under the Bankruptcy Act. In McCarthy, the Court held that a
party's right to assert the privilege was limited only by the "general rules gov-
erning the admissibility of evidence and competency of witnesses""' 5 and that
the privilege was not affected by bankruptcy proceedings.
The privilege against self-incrimination holds a special position among tes-
timonial privileges by virtue of its express recognition in the Bill of Rights and
its highly personal nature."6 The Court did not base its decision, in McCarthy,
on these unique features but, instead, addressed the distinction between adjec-
tive law"7 and substantive law. The Court held that testimonial privileges are
part of adjective law, distinct from the substantive law of bankruptcy."' Essen-
tially, the Court, in McCarthy, held that the Bankruptcy Act cannot directly
affect testimonial privileges but can only apply them where appropriate."9
Although the attorney-client privilege can be distinguished from the
privilege against self-incrimination, 0 the broad language used by the Court in
McCarthy logically applies to all testimonial privileges. Under this reasoning,
the trustee in bankruptcy cannot look to the Bankruptcy Code for authority
over the debtor's attorney-client privilege since the substantive law of
bankruptcy cannot alter the adjective law of testimonial privilege.
CONCLUSION
The question of the trustee's authority to waive a corporate debtor's
attorney-client privilege is one which requires careful analysis and reasoned
judgment. As in all matters of testimonial privilege, the costs which attend its
"'See generally Hoffman, The Attorney-Client Privilege in Proceedings Under the Bankruptcy Act of 1898
and The Bankruptcy Reform Act of 1978, 53 Am. BANKR. L.J. 231, 240 (1979) (discussing the analogous
relationship between the attorney-client privilege and the privilege against self-incrimination).
"'266 U.S. 34 (1924).
1id. at 39-40.
"'See Radiant Burners, Inc. v. American Gas Ass'n., 320 F.2d 314, 322 (7th Cir.), cert. denied, 375 U.S. 929
(1963) (recognizing the highly personal nature and constitutional grounding of the privilege against self-
incrimination as distinguishing factors between that privilege and the attorney-client privilege).
"'"The aggregate of rules of procedure or practice. As opposed to that body of law which the courts are
established to administer (called "substantive law"), it means the rules according to which the substantive
law is administered." BLACK'S LAW DICTIONARY 38 (5th ed. 1979).
"'McCarthy, 266 U.S. at 39-42.
1id.
"'Unlike the attorney-client privilege, the privilege against self-incrimination does not apply to corporations.
See, e.g., United States v. White, 322 U.S. 694 (1944). Another distinction is that the privilege against self-
incrimination can only be asserted by its holder. See Fisher v. United States, 425 U.S. 391 (1976).
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use are clear in the form of hindered investigations and obstructions to
discovery.' Since the benefits of the privilege are less visible than its attendant
costs, a decision on this issue should be particularly sensitive to those benefits.
On the basis of the policy reasons underlying the attorney-client privilege, the
Seventh Circuit held that bankruptcy proceedings should not affect the general
rules governing the use of the privilege. In light of the relevant legal and policy
considerations, the Seventh Circuit's decision, that authority over the privilege
should remain with the debtor corporation's directors, was correct.
Permitting the directors of a debtor corporation to retain control over the
attorney-client privilege would minimize the chilling effect on attorney-client
communications caused by the fear of compelled disclosure. A consideration of
the comparative fiduciary duties of the debtor corporation's directors and its
trustee also urges that authority over the privilege properly lies with the direc-
tors. Finally, prior rulings of the Supreme Court recognizing testimonial
privilege as an area of law distinct from the substantive law of bankruptcy urge
that a separate rule regulating use of the privilege should not apply in
bankruptcy proceedings. For each of these reasons, the Seventh Circuit's deci-
sion, in Weintraub, was correct in permitting authority over the attorney-
client privilege to remain with the debtor corporation's directors.
THOMAS R. HIMMELSPACH
"'In the case of Weintraub, the ruling of the court may actually have little impact on the Commission's in-
vestigation of CDCB. In 1983, Frank McGhee, president of CDCB, entered a guilty plea to the charge of
embezzlement for which he was given a three year sentence. Subsequent to his conviction, McGhee has
cooperated with the trustee and has supplied answers to most of the questions the Commission had asked of
Weintraub. See 7 NATL L.., Nov. 12, 1984, at 25, col. I.
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